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THE PURSUIT OF THE HUNT, INTERRUPTED:
CHANGING LITERARY IMAGES OF LAW
William Joseph Wagner+
The Law and Literature Movement appeared within American legal
scholarship some fifteen years ago.1 Yet, the inherent methodological
challenge of the project continues to elicit uncertainty. The legal method
of case adjudication and legislative drafting makes language an instru-
ment to control conduct and outcomes in social life. The argumentation
of the legal brief uses language as a tool to reach pragmatic results.
The imaginative use of language in literature differs. The notion of
lawyers turning to literature as a source for legal studies leads some to
fear for the rigor of legal reasoning and others for the integrity of literary
interpretation.2 Each study in law and literature is an occasion for fur-
ther methodological and theoretical clarification of the law and literature
project. This is true even as each study seeks to reveal new insights
about law from the study of particular literary works.3
+ Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; A.B., Uni-
versity of California, Los Angeles, 1975; J.D., Yale University Law School, 1978; M.A., The
Catholic University of America, 1983. My thanks to Denise Ryan for her research assistance in
the preparation of this article.
1. See generally RICHARD H. WEISBERG, THE FAILURE OF THE WORD (Yale Univ.
Press 1984); JAMES BOYD WHITE, HERACLES' Bow: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND
POETICS OF THE LAW (Univ. of Wisc. Press 1985); JAMES BOYD WHITE, WHEN WORDS
LOSE THEIR MEANING: CONSTITUTIONS AND RECONSTITUTIONS OF LANGUAGE,
CHARACTER, AND COMMUNITY (Univ. of Chicago Press 1984). James Boyd White has
sometimes been called the father of the movement. His own work in the area traces back
to THE LEGAL IMAGINATION: STUDIES IN THE NATURE OF LEGAL THOUGHT AND
EXPRESSION (1973). A comprehensive and influential work is RICHARD A. POSNER,
LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION (Harvard Univ. Press 1988)
[hereinafter POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE].
2. Judge Richard Posner wrote:
But is it a healthy, balanced, and fruitful growth [of the law and literature move-
ment]? I have some doubts. Although some fine scholarship has appeared, the
extent to which law and literature have been mutually illuminated is modest.
Some practitioners have exaggerated the commonalties between the two fields,
paying insufficient heed to the profound differences between law and literature.
In their hands literary theory, or particular works of literature, are contorted to
make literature seem relevant to law, and law is contorted to make it seem con-
tinuos with literature.
POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 1, at 13.
3. Author Martha Grace Duncan illustrates the sometimes disturbing character of
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The present article is no exception. Its topic, "The Pursuit of the Hunt,
Interrupted," is a striking image recurring in Western literary representa-
tions of law. The image expresses the transformative power of law. The
classical instance appears in the work of Aeschylus, and later examples
pattern in works by Charles Dickens, Franz Kafka and Tom Wolfe. In
these works, the image reveals evolving and radically contrasting concep-
tions of law. The original use of the image to represent law as liberating
objectivity gives way to its employment to depict law as violated privacy
and even the existential disintegration of the self. Each of these diverse
conceptions provides fertile ground for jurisprudential reflection. In the
course of reaching its substantive conclusions, this article seeks to shed
light on the theoretical and methodological requisites of a valid and fruit-
ful application of literary sources in jurisprudence.
The article begins by explicating the original literary image of the pur-
suit of the hunt interrupted, within its thematic setting in Aeschylus. It
then offers theoretical and methodological postulates for drawing out the
fuller meaning for law and legal studies of the image. It explores varia-
tions on the same pattern of imagery in subsequent works of Western lit-
erature, and offers reflections on how these variations can enrich our un-
derstanding of the nature and meaning of law.
I. THE IMAGE OF THE "PURSUIT OF THE HUNT, INTERRUPTED" IN
AESCHYLUS'S THE EUMENIDES
Among literary representations of law, few equal Aeschylus's The
Eumenides,4 the concluding play in the tragic cycle of plays known as the
Oresteia. As part of the heritage of classical Greece, this play stands
close to the fountainhead of the Western political tradition Perhaps no
other work, whether ancient or modern, makes the nature and meaning
of law and legal process such a central theme. In The Eumenides,
Aeschylus's literary depiction of law relies on the image of the "pursuit
of the hunt," which is interrupted and transformed dramatically by the
the insights of studies in law and literature in her writings. See generally MARTHA
GRACE DUNCAN, ROMANTIC OUTLAWS, BLESSED PRISONS: THE UNCONSCIOUS
MEANINGS OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT (1996). The following is a sampling of section
headings from her book: "Cradled in the Sea: Positive Images of Prison and Theories of
Punishment;" "A Strange Liking: Our Admiration for Criminals;" "In Slime and Dark-
ness: The Metaphor of Filth in Criminal Justice;" and "The Romanitization of Criminals
and the Defense Against Despair." Id.
4. AESCHYLUS, The Eumenides, in THE ORESTEIA 227 (Robert Fagles trans., Pen-
guin Books 1977) [hereinafter AESCHYLUS, The Eumenides].
5. See generally JOHN JONES, ON ARISTOTLE AND GREEK TRAGEDY (1962); See
also generally WALTER KAUFMANN, TRAGEDY AND PHILOSOPHY (Anchor Books 1968).
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intervention of legal process. As a first step in its inquiry, this article sets
out this literary image and its meaning within the thematics of The Eu-
menides.
As the action in the play commences, the hero Orestes, although a
human being, is prey in a hunt. His pursuers are the Furies, hideous
mythological creatures who avenge the unnatural murdering of parents.
Having shed the blood of his mother, Orestes appears doomed to the
House of Atreus, that "echoing womb of guilt"6 from which he springs.
His destruction by the Furies is the inexorable next step in the Atrean
cycle of vengeance, guilt, and violence, because "[f]ate ordains ... the
Furies, absolute till the end of time."7
Orestes's death appears the necessary consequence of having mur-
dered his mother, Clytaemnestra. Just as her death appears to be the re-
sult of her having betrayed her husband, Agamemnon. Likewise, Aga-
memnon's fate appears to be the necessary consequence of his ritual
sacrifice of Orestes's sister, Iphigeniea, which conjured winds to launch
the Greek fleet. Thus, when her son Orestes asks, "[what-kill my fa-
ther, then you'd live with me?" Clytaemnestra answers, "[d]estiny had a
hand in that, my child," and he responds, "[t]his too: destiny is handing
you your death."8
The dramaturgical challenge in The Eumenides is to resolve the com-
plex action of the cycle's preliminary and middle plays.9 Aeschylus for-
mulates the needed resolution by first heightening the tension as Apollo,
the god of reason, is unable to drive the Furies away.' ° In response to
Apollo's efforts to control them, the Furies retort, "Lord Apollo, now it
is your turn to listen."" Aeschylus then resolves this tension through the
device of acquittal by a human law court, the Tribunal of the Areopagus.
Pallas Athena divinely established the Tribunal when cautioning: "But
by all rights not even I [Athena] should decide a case of murder-murder
whets the passions .... But since the matter comes to rest on us, I will
6. AESCHYLUS, Agamemnon, in THE ORESTEIA 99, 145 (Robert Fagles trans., Pen-
guin Books 1977) [hereinafter AESCHYLUS, Agamemnon].
7. AESCHYLUS, The Eumenides, supra note 4, at 248.
8. AESCHYLUS, The Libation Bearers, in THE ORESTEIA 217 (Robert Fagles trans.,
Penguin Books 1977) [hereinafter AESCHYLUS, The Libation Bearers].
9. See generally AESCHYLUS, Agammenon, supra note 6; AESCHYLUS, The Libation
Bearers, supra note 8.
10. See AESCHYLUS, The Libation Bearers, supra note 8, at 191. Apollo commis-
sioned the killing of Clytaemnestra and her lover when stating: "Gore them like a bull! ...
or pay their debt with your own life." Id.
11. AESCHYLUS, The Eumenides, supra note 4, at 238-39.
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appoint the judges of manslaughter, swear them in, and found a tribunal
here for all time to come."' 2
Appeased and transformed, the Furies concede the authority of the
Tribunal's verdict by the play's end. They shed their dreaded form, their
threats of "poison over the soil," and "the bloody tide."13 The Furies be-
come the "Eumenides," the benevolent guardians of hearth and home to
whom the women of Athens enjoin: "You great good Furies, bless the
land with kindly hearts, you Awesome Spirits, come-exult in the blazing
torch, exultant in our fires, journey on.' 14
Within the frame of the final play, the pre-legal human situation is rep-
resented as one of anxiety and flight before pursuers in the form of in-
stinctual, customary blood loyalties, and animosities (i.e., the Furies).15
Guilt flows from the pollution of blood spilling in violation of a taboo.
Questions of justification or excuse, central to law, do not check the Fu-
ries, who claim that "we broke no trial-no god can be our judge."'6 The
taboo arises from the biological relationship of human generation. 7 Its
violation calls for automatic retribution in the form of "bloodlust."'' 8 The
Furies hound to death, presenting themselves as a force of remem-
brance,' 9 of rotting life,2° and of rage and revulsion.2'
II. SEEKING THE MEANING OF THE LITERARY IMAGE FOR LEGAL
STUDIES
Aeschylus's vision is a philosophical one, and his themes are expressly
jurisprudential. With a lack of care, The Eumenides might be read as ju-
risprudence rather than literature. In such a reading, the play would be
interpreted as legal reasoning, making its points through literary devices.
This error would be only compounded if the reader mistook the author's
12. Id. at 252-53.
13. Id. at 266.
14. Id. at 276.
15. See id. at 234 (describing the Furies: "Deep in the endless heartland they will
drive you, striding horizons, feet pounding the earth for ever, on, on over seas and cities
swept by tides!").
16. Id. at 246.
17. See id. at 243 (explaining that it is "the mother's blood that wets the ground").
18. Id. at 269.
19. See id. at 246.
20. See id. at 233.
21. See id. at 233, 238 (describing the Furies: "But black they are, and so repulsive.
Their heavy rasping breathing makes me cringe.., their eyes ooze a discharge, sickening,.
• . black froth erupting from [their] lungs, vomit the clots of all the murders [they] have
drained.")
[Vol. 49:945
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borrowings from Greek mythology to validate the authority of law for a
paradigm of literature's proper use "at the hands of the law." An exam-
ple might be his use of Athena, the goddess of wisdom, to cast the de-
ciding vote for acquittal, giving divine sanction to the authority of human
law. But this is merely sacred literature at the hands of the profane.
On reflection, The Eumenides is precisely the opposite of "literature in
the hands of law." It is "law at the hand of literature." The meaning of
law in the play is found within an imaginative construct; it has an aes-
thetic context, not a social or philosophical one. The persuasiveness of
literary depictions of law derives, not from philosophical argument or
factual proof, but from the narrative's aesthetic or imaginative power. If
legal studies are to draw on literary meaning, they must give an account
of the difference between literary and legal meaning. They must also de-
vise a methodology for translating literary meaning into the mentality of
their own discipline. An excursus dealing with the relation between legal
and literary meaning will, therefore, be a prelude to interpreting
Aeschylus's use of the hunt to represent the law's transformative power.
A. Existing Approaches to Law and Literature: Law and Economics and
Critical Legal Studies
Two schools of thought propose possible solutions to the problems of
translation posed by the study of law and literature. One of these is the
school of "law and economics," as postulated by Richard Posner.2 ' The
other school is Critical Legal Studies, as pursued by thinkers like
24Roberto Unger. The "law and economics" solution conceives of the law
as facilitating a rational economic choice. It holds that law exists to
maximize wealth.25 In effect, it treats law as instrumental for realizing a
certain conception of human nature.26 In this approach, literature's value
for legal studies lies in illustrating these ideas. Literature provides situ-
22. See generally ERICH AUERBACH, MIMESIS: THE REPRESENTATION OF REALITY
IN WESTERN LITERATURE (Willard R. Trask trans., 1953).
23. See generally, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, The Economic Approach to Law, in
THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 353-91 (Harvard Univ. Press 1990); RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE pt. 1 (Harvard Univ. Press 1983) [hereinafter
POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE].
24. See generally ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES
MOVEMENT (1986) [hereinafter UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT];
ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY (1976) [hereinafter
UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY].
25. See POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE, supra note 23, at 65-87.
26. This conception is exposed in the postulates of neoclassical economics.
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ational paradigms for tracing the implications of economic theory. In
Economics of Justice, for example, Judge Posner uses Homer to illustrate
his theory of law as wealth maximization.27 In Law and Literature: A
Misunderstood Relation, he interprets The Eumenides as a meditation on
the relative inefficiency of the strict liability of a revenge code, compared
to more sophisticated fault-based systems.28 He relates literature and law
by reducing both to normative economics. Owen Fiss has argued that
such an approach represents the "death of law."2 9 James Boyd White has
argued that however effective in communicating economic insights, it re-
sults in readings of literature that are unsatisfactory.3°
Critical Legal Studies proposes a radically different theory and method
for relating law and literature. It relies on the deconstruction of French
literary criticism and treats law as an artifact of politics.3' It considers the
legal text a record of the faction's effort to memorialize its vision of real-
ity, once it has prevailed in a political dispute. Upon closer reading, the
legal text reveals itself to be the product of an act of will, which bears
traces of the alternative visions it has suppressed in coming into exis-
32tence. Critical jurisprudence exists to expose the power struggles con-
cealed behind the law and to enable subjectively authentic visions of
good to contend with more established views in the ongoing political
struggle.33 Since the literary text is essentially the artifact of political op-
position, its surface meaning deconstructs to reveal alternative perspec-
tives, which were denied a hearing in its creation. These embody the
same marginal vantage points excluded by the victorious parties who
achieve control of the law. Thus, in The Eumenides, the acquittal of the
matricide, Orestes, may be interpreted as the suppression by patriarchy
of matriarchy, symbolizing the literary and mythic co-optation of the
feminine. The attribution of the authority of the goddess Athena to her
birth from the head of a male god, rather than from a mother can be so
27. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE, supra note 23, at 119-45.
28. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 1, at 34-38.
29. Owen M. Fiss, The Death of Law, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 2-8 (1986).
30. See James Boyd White, What Can a Lawyer Learn from Literature?, 102 HARV.
L. REV. 2014,2014 (1989) (reviewing POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 1).
31. See J.M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743, 743
(1987); Daniel Williams, Law, Deconstruction and Literature: The Critical Stances of Der-
rida and Foucault, 6 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 359, 359-72 (1988); see generally
JACQUES DERRIDA, MARGINS OF PHILOSOPHY (Alan Bass trans., 1982); JACQUES
DERRIDA, WRITING AND DIFFERENCE (Alan Bass trans., 1978).
32. See Balkin, supra note 31, at 762-63.
33. See UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT, supra note 24, at 109-
[Vol. 49:945
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interpreted. 34 But, it can be countered that the dichotomies and opposi-
tions of the play's themes relating to gender arise within the author's in-
tention and do not depend upon deconstruction of the work as an imagi-
native whole.35
Critical Legal Studies makes its purely negative critique and its com-
mitment to politics a bridge for connecting law and literature. The price,
however, is a reduction of both law and literature to politics.36 This re-
duction undercuts the possibility of reasoned justification of moral posi-
tions.
Neither "law and economics" nor Critical Legal Studies can sustain an
adequate reading of the image of the pursuit of the hunt, as it appears in
The Eumenides. Each school makes as an a priori partial truth the link
between law and literature. Each disregards the unity of the literary
work for the sake of ensuring that some feature of the work corresponds
to the a priori element with which it starts. Having broken the work's
unity, both schools distort what they selectively appropriate, discounting
what does not fit their a priori assumptions and interests.
B. The Theoretical and Methodological Challenge for the Law and
Literature Movement
The theoretical and methodological challenge for the Law and Litera-
ture Movement is to find an alternative that builds bridges from litera-
ture into legal studies, without incurring the reductionism of "law and
economics" or Critical Legal Studies. Such an alternative properly starts
with the distinctive nature of literature as an imaginative construction of
reality.37 Literary meaning takes form through a willing suspension of
disbelief, allowing fragmentary verbal symbols and images to stand for
the whole of reality. The literary construction of reality works because
of the human capacity, and need, to grasp the meaning of the whole of
reality, even though the human being's actual encounter with reality re-
mains partial, limited to the narrow categories of human thought and
34. See Robin West, Law, Literature, and the Celebration of Authority, 83 Nw. U. L.
REV. 977, 1003 (1989) (reviewing POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 1).
35. See Paul Gewirtz, Aeschylus' Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1043, 1052-54 (1988).
Gewirtz states that The Oresteia can be viewed as "a myth of inclusion" of the female. Id.
at 1054 (citing Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 485 P.2d 529, 541 (1971)).
36. See Fiss, supra note 29, at 14-15. Fiss charges this application of deconstruction-
ism to law, no less than he does "law and economics," as implying "the death of law." Id.
37. See generally I.A. RICHARDS, ET AL., THE FOUNDATIONS OF AESTHETICS (2d
ed. 1925).
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speech." By definition, the literary work always is an end in itself.
Readings of a work will occur within a tradition of interpretation39 and
will be colored by the reader's attitudes and interests.4° However, the lit-
erary work, if it has merit, properly remains an object of interpretation
for its own sake.41
Likewise, the project of relating literary sources to legal studies must
begin with insight into the distinctive nature of the law, as another verbal
construction of reality. Where literature makes possible a kind of imagi-
native knowing, law mediates a kind of practical choosing and acting.42
Through its verbal forms, the law instantiates relationships of persons to
one another and to things. Legal forms are taken as the relationships
they symbolize, so that they can be manipulated. This act of identifica-
tion requires a practical, as opposed to imaginative, suspension of disbe-
lief.
The law, for instance, stipulates that the words of a contract tell the
relationship between two persons, or that those of a deed signify the rela-
tionship between the person and a tract of land. It can do so, only
through the human capacity and need to treat such relationships as
things.43 Similarly, the law can provide for the adjudication of an ac-
cused's criminal guilt only through the human capacity and need to treat
the criminal's dereliction as a thing." The legal construction of reality
38. See MURRAY KRIEGER, EKPHRASIs: THE ILLUSION OF THE NATURAL SIGN 261
(1992) ("Let me ... introduce the doubts ... created by the fear of parochialism, as I
worry about putting forth ... this unique cultural mission for literature: the mission of ca-
tering both to our need for semiotic illusion."); see also T. W. ADORNO, AESTHETIC
THEORY 191 (C. Lenhardt trans., 1970) ("[Elvery act of making in art is an endless en-
deavour to articulate what is not makable, namely spirit.").
39. See F. R. LEAVIS, REVALUATION 3 (1947) ("In dealing with individual poets the
critic, whether explicitly or not, is dealing with tradition, for they live in it."); see also T. S.
ELIOT, Tradition and the Individual Talent, in THE SACRED WOOD: ESSAYS ON POETRY
AND CRITICISM 47-49 (1972).
40. See generally STANLEY FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? (Harvard Univ.
Press 1980).
41. See James Boyd White, Law and Language: Reading Law and Reading Literature,
60 TEX. L. REV. 415, 428 (1982) (referring to this notion as a work of literature's "ir-
reducibility"); see generally W. K. WIMSATT, JR., THE VERBAL ICON: STUDIES IN THE
MEANING OF POETRY (1967).
42. Law can be understood as an expression of practical reason. See JOHN FINNIS,
NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHT 260-96 (1980). As such, it represents an "em-
bodiment of public morality." Fiss, supra note 29, at 14. The rejection of this concept is
seen as the "common base line" of both law and economics and Critical Legal Studies. Id.
43. See generally AXEL HAGERSTROM, INQUIRIES INTO THE NATURE OF LAW AND
MORALS (C.D. Broad trans., 1953).
44. See generally id.
[Vol. 49:945
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treats its fragmentary symbols, rituals, and gestures as the whole of rela-
tionships, which actually are nontangible and transcend any particular
concrete manifestation. Legal method seeks univocal and instrumental
uses of language.45 In this respect, it differs decidedly from literary uses
of language, which makes use of ambiguity, irony, and multiple mean-
ings.46 Thus, legal method is prone to violate the literary texts on which it
bestows its attention.
C. Consciousness of the Diverse Ways Literature Has Value for Law
If lawyers are to make sense of literary sources, they must read them as
an imaginative construct, while relating them to law, which is a practical
or moral construct. If this interconstructive reading is to work, lawyers
must orient their reading to values with meaning both within the litera-
ture they are reading and within their own constructive efforts within
law. The law has an instrumental character at one level, but for its fuller
meaning it also depends decisively, on basic values at other levels.
Awareness of these diverse values and how they come to expression in
literary sources makes possible the effective use of such sources by legal
studies.
1. Enhanced Appreciation of Language
One value supporting an authentic reading of literary sources by law-
yers is the undifferentiated human capacity to employ language. This
capacity makes both law and literature possible. The linguistic nature of
law is, for example, the basis of the jurisprudence of H.L.A. Hart and his
45. In the words of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.:
Far the most important and pretty nearly the whole meaning of every ... effort
of legal thought is to make [the statement of the rule] more precise, and to gen-
eralize them into a thoroughly connected system. The process is one, from a
lawyer's statement of a case, eliminating as it does all the dramatic elements with
which his client's story has clothed it, and retaining only the facts of legal import,
up to the final analyses and abstract universals of theoretic jurisprudence. The
reason why a lawyer does not mention that his client wore a white hat when he
made a contract, while Mrs. Quickly would be sure to dwell upon it along with
the parcel gilt goblet and the sea-coal fire, is that he foresees that the public
force will act in the same way whatever his client had upon his head.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 61,61-62 (1897).
46. Literary language expresses ambivalence and ambiguity in part because of its
emotive character. "The emotions correlative to the objects of poetry become a part of
the matter dealt with.., presented in their objects and interpreted as a pattern of knowl-
edge." WIMSATT, supra note 41, at 38.
20001
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followers who treat law as a language game.
By appreciating fiction with legal themes as literature, lawyers are able
to deepen their appreciation for the intrinsic value and beauty of lan-
guage in all of its manifestations.48 On the level of rhetoric, the lawyer
can seek to emulate literature in its stylistic beauty and subtlety. If law-
yers perceive the virtuosity of Aeschylus, they may come to write better
legal opinions,49 and effectively incorporate dramatic and literary allu-
sions to attain greater truth and elegance in legal expression.
2. Critical Consciousness of the Contingency of Form and Meaning in
Law
By representing law imaginatively, literature allows lawyers to gain dis-
tance and perspective on their own form of representing reality. The re-
sulting vision can enable lawyers to undergo a critical conversion, ac-
cording to which they understand the contingency of their own
construction of reality. By grasping that Aeschylus's representation of
the Tribunal of the Areopagus is but a literary device serving Aeschylus's
contingent purposes, ° the lawyer can comprehend the contingent nature
of the language and concepts applied, for various purposes, in every
courtroom."
As the legal reader understands that a preconscious orientation to
value underlies the response of the characters within the literary narra-
tive, he or she is likely to become more aware of his or her own precon-
47. See H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 83-84,86 (1961).
48. "In some broader way, all the efforts of our verbal wisdom-philosophy, history,
science, religion, law-are myths, all myths, that is, imaginative constructs." W.K.
WIMSAT-r, JR., DAY OF THE LEOPARDS: ESSAYS IN DEFENSE OF POEMS 75 (1976) [here-
inafter WIMSATr, ESSAYS]. "[T]he real value literature has in legal studies is ... nothing
more than the delight its greater vision elicits in the reader, and the hope ... the reader's
vision will become more.discerning for the effort of reading." William Ian Miller, Beating
Up on Women and Old Men and Other Enormities: A Social Historical Inquiry into Liter-
ary Sources, 39 MERCER L. REV. 753, 766 (1988).
49. See Richard Weisberg, How Judges Speak: Some Lessons on Adjudication in Billy
Budd, Sailor, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 1 (1982) (exemplifying of this emphasis on law "as lit-
erature"); see generally Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEx. L. REV. 373 (1983).
50. Cf PAUL TILLICH, SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY (Univ. of Chicago Press 1967). Paul
Tillich uses the idea of a broken symbol to express the loss of naive belief in symbols, but
argues that it is only when symbols are "broken" in this sense, through critical awareness
that understands their contingency, that they can be fully appropriated by theological un-
derstanding. See generally id.
51. W.K. Wimsatt, Jr. asserts that "[1literary study helps us to see through false
myths, half-truths, mob speech, and gabble idioms" by raising our critical awareness.
WIMSATT, ESSAYS, supra note 48, at 75.
[Vol. 49:945
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scious assumptions, shaping his or her expectations about law and other
aspects of social life. Such critical-mindedness supports a more truly eq-
uitable application of the rules to the facts of a case, and a fairer consid-
eration of various possibilities of legal reform.
3. Deepening of the Capacity for Empathy through Imaginative
Identification with Others
Literature invites the reader to identify, in feeling, with diverse per-
spectives and modes of construing reality as an expression of transcen-
dence. It calls forth from the reader a universal imaginative identifica-
tion with diverse subjectivities, even reprehensible ones. Arguably, the
greater the literature, the greater its author's "negative capability.
5 2
Aeschylus, for example, forges identification with a man who has killed a
parent and, at the same time, with the horror of his guilt that the Furies
personify.
Some might also say that the greater the literature the more fully it en-
compasses the diverse ways society construes reality and channels social
exchange through its institutions, one of which is law. The adjudicative
virtue of aequitas, or equity,53 may be deepened in the judge who learns
from the diverse subjectivities and circumstances that the "negative ca-
52. THE NEW PRINCETON ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POETRY AND POETICS 824-25 (Alex
Preminger & T. V. F. Brogan eds., Princeton Univ. Press 1993) (describing a reader's ca-
pacity to make present and believable the diversity of human perspectives):
Negative capability is Keats's phrase for a power of sympathy and a freedom
from self-consciousness which peculiarly characterize the artist. It occurs in a let-
ter of 22 December 1818: there is a quality that goes "to form a Man of
Achievement esp. in lit. & which Shakespeare possessed so enormously-I mean
[negative capability] that is when man is capable of being in uncertainties, Mys-
teries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact & reason." The quality
has to do as well with a capability "of remaining content with half knowledge."
Elsewhere, speaking of the "poetical Character" in general, Keats observes that
"it has no character-it enjoys light and shade; it lives in gusto, be it foul or fair,
high or low, rich or poor, mean or elevated-It has as much delight in conceiving
an Iago as an Imogen. What shocks the virtuous philosopher delights the came-
lion Poet."
Id.
53. Saint Thomas Aquinas defines equity in this way:
Now it happens often that the observance of some point of law conduces to the
common weal in the majority of instances, and yet, in some cases, is very hurtful.
Since then the lawgiver cannot have in view every single case, he shapes the law
according to what happens most frequently, by directing his attention to the
common good. Wherefore if a case arise wherein the observance of that law
would be hurtful to the general welfare, it should not be observed.
2 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA 1021 (Fathers of the English Dominican
Province trans., Christian Classics 1948).
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pability" of the literary work expresses. Through their reading of litera-
ture, judges may hope to decide cases more fairly, and to articulate a
more authentic and subtle jurisprudence of the rules and standards they
apply.
4. Aesthetic Validation of Basic Values
Each of the three values discussed thus far finds its realization in the
character and skills of the reader who is lawyer or judge. But a literary
work may also have a value for jurisprudence in illuminating the mean-
ing of legal institutions. A literary work may explore the intrinsic moral
value of law itself, as does The Eumenides. Or, it may offer a pattern of
good in society and individual lives, which suggests that it belongs to the
law to advance. Negatively, it may seek to bring into focus the manifold
ways in which natural and societal forces may thwart the law's due end.
Persuasiveness of an aesthetic nature may gain the reader's assent, where
overt philosophical arguments might not.
In the absence of contemporary consensus over normative reasoning,
the Law and Literature movement has an appeal because it assists juris-
prudence in affirming values. Normative jurisprudence seeks warrants,
which can gain general acceptance in the face of a breakdown in what
counts as a good moral argument. Both Critical Legal Studies and "law
and economics" can be understood as making such uses of literary
sources. The ideals espoused by jurisprudential schools merit substantive
philosophical evaluation. Literature, as an imaginative construction, de-
serves separate attention for what its own terms can supply by way of
normative direction for law.5
Normative jurisprudence ordinarily presents its warrants in the form of
propositions. Literary resources can give jurisprudence non-
propositional grounds for its positions. Ideas emerge with consciousness
that may first take a symbolic form.56 Further, literary meaning may
54. See Gary Minda, Jurisprudence at Century's End, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 27, 48
(1993) ("[T]he law and literature perspective has been applied by scholars seeking to re-
suscitate prevailing jurisprudential conceptions of law.") Minda identifies Dworkin, Fiss,
and James Boyd White as using literature as such a crutch. See id. at 48-49.
55. Finally, there is the jurisprudential challenge of deciding which normative values
found to be aesthetically compelling within the construct of the literary representation can
be justified as compelling within the construction of the law. Within legal studies, the in-
strumental and pragmatic nature of legislative and adjudicative method must itself be
grounded in a deeper awareness of the values that justify and place this method within its
appropriate sphere as an authentically human activity. At this point, literary study can
precipitate a dialogue between legal studies and philosophy.
56. See PAUL RICOEUR, THE SYMBOLISM OF EVIL 19 (Emerson Buchanan trans.,
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communicate perceptions and relationships concerning value not fully
expressible in propositional terms. The literary statement of values takes
form as a whole, including specific values within a many-sided frame of
meaning. In the imaginative "whole," opposites do not cancel one an-
other. The moral evaluation, which the literary work invites of each
character, moral choice, or societal institution, is rarely univocal in its en-
tirety. Jurisprudence incorporates literary borrowings most effectively to
express complex truths about human situations, rather than as illustra-
tions of a particular school's basic tenets.
5 7
The study of literary techniques has a distinctive value for jurispru-
dence where the legal system itself enshrines a narrative or story in sup-
port of its legitimacy. Examples include the Exodus account from the
Bible and the Social Contract myth of seventeenth and eighteenth cen-
tury political theory.
This application of literary studies extends to other, perhaps less ele-
vated, instances of the law's reliance on narrative. Every judicial opinion
can be understood, for example, not merely as a report on how elements
of fact properly fit a rule, but as the narrative of a tale in which the
holding represents the resolution of the plot. Every legislative act, for
that matter, takes notice of a story of a breakdown of social order in
which it is to be the resolution of the plot. The legislative act can be un-
derstood as a script for stories that will unfold in the future.
Literary sources have special relevance, as well, in forms of linguisti-
cally oriented jurisprudence defining themselves as interpretation. For
example, Ronald Dworkin considers judicial opinions to be interpreta-
tions of texts, themselves prior interpretations of yet earlier texts by
other jurists, 9 so that each judicial opinion adds a further installment in
the unfolding story of American law. The measure of the decision's va-
lidity, for Dworkin, is essentially the aesthetic determination of whether
it advances the overall coherence of the larger narrative framed by the
legal system as a whole. In this jurisprudential vision, the methodology
of legal reasoning flows directly into that of literary criticism, the princi-
pal distinction being whether the text interpreted is legal or nonlegal.
1967) (stating that "symbols give rise to thought").
57. See generally Robin West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of Consent
in the Moral and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV.
384 (1985).
58. See Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 23 (1983).
59. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAW's EMPIRE (Harvard Univ. Press 1986).
2000]
Catholic University Law Review
D. Interpreting Aeschylus's Image
The meaning of Aeschylus's image of the "pursuit of the hunt, inter-
rupted" for jurisprudence, no less than for literature, must first be stud-
ied within the unbroken imaginative whole of the play. Only then can
jurisprudence establish reliable connections between that meaning and
the object of its own inquiry.
1. Aeschylus's Image Considered Within the Imaginative Whole of The
Eumenides
Aeschylus's depiction of a human person hunted as the prey has a vis-
ceral effect on the reader and elicits primal fear. Such is the import when
Chief Fury speaks:
The clear trail of the man. After it, silent but it tracks his guilt
to light. He's wounded-go for the fawn, my hounds, the splash
of blood, hunt him, rake him down. Oh, the labour, the man-
killing labour. My lungs are bursting... over the wide rolling
earth we've ranged in flock ... in wingless flight and now we
come, all hot pursuit.., and now he's here, somewhere, cow-
ering like a hare . . . the reek of human blood-it's laughter to
my heart!"°
It is difficult to imagine an experience more terrifying. The person, in
such a quandary, would feel fear so intense that he or she could lose the
use of reason. At best, he or she would be reduced to a desperate
scramble for survival, relying on animal instinct.
The hunted human is not respected as a rational being. He or she is
deprived of the fundamentals of security, needed for rational choice and
action. Aeschylus analogizes the situation's tendency to overwhelm rea-
son to a sailor going under in a storm at sea: "[H]e'll strike his sails, har-
ried at long last, stunned when the squalls of torment break his spars to
bits. He cries to the deaf, he wrestles walls of sea sheer whirlpools down,
down, with the gods' laughter breaking over the man's hot heart-they
see him flailing, crushed."61 This image of shipwreck symbolizes the hu-
man being inundated by emotion and reverting to futile instincts. He or
she is dehumanized even before being captured and killed.
Orestes's actions have triggered the forces that pursue him. He under-
took these actions out of conscience (the voice of Apollo) for the sake of
justice. Orestes has acted in retribution for an injustice. He avenges an
60. AESCHYLUS, The Eumenides, supra note 4, at 242.
61. Id. at 255.
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individual, rather than a bloodline. His action rests on a judgment about
what is just within the social relationships of marriage and household.6
He seeks to restore honor to damaged social relationships.63 In their
simplemindedness, the Furies are unable to acknowledge the justification
or excuse Orestes's intentions provide.
The Furies symbolize both the external threat of blood vengeance by
human pursuers and the internal effect of guilt or fear of the conse-
quences of past actions. They express both inner and outer pressures
undermining Orestes's rational agency. The play's final outcome offers
law, as a societal response, transformative of this initial dilemma. Apollo
is vindicated. The individual must do justice according to reason, even if
this conflicts with the expectations of family and tribe.
As the play's action is resolved, Athena has ruled that the political
community is to adjudicate conflicts over past actions, publicly and ac-
cording to reason. It is to do so through law and legal process. Thus, she
establishes a tribunal and it engages in the findings of fact and considers
the legal arguments.6 The Tribunal reaches an acquittal for the reasons
adduced. Clytaemnestra has used treachery to kill Agamemnon in the
security of his home, and she has done so to further adultery begun dur-
ing his absence for the honorable purpose of war. Orestes has acted un-
der divine sanction.6 He has been purged and poses no further harm.
Through the image of the "pursuit of the hunt, interrupted," Aeschylus
gives imaginative validation to several effects of law: it (1) supports and
sustains free and reasonable actions, (2) creates a public realm of politi-
cal and moral choice, and (3) conditions the validation of kinship and
domestic ties upon their integration into a larger composite, including
the realm of political and moral freedom.6 He represents law as serving
62. See id. at 240 ("Marriage of man and wife is... stronger than oaths, and Justice
guards its life.").
63. See id. at 191 ("I can still hear the god-a high voice ringing with winters of disas-
ter, piercing the heart within me, warm and strong, unless I hunt my father's murderers,
cut them down in their own style-they destroyed my birthrite.").
64. See id. at 253 ("My contestants, summon your trusted witnesses and proofs, your
defenders under oath to help your cause.").
65. See id. at 256-60. Apollo urged Orestes's action in advance and attested, after the
fact, that it was in accord with Zeus's will. See id. at 257-61. As a counter-argument to the
Furies' assertion of matrilineal loyalty, Apollo asserts before the court that the father, not
the mother, is the source of the child. See id. at 260. "The woman you call the mother of
the child is not the parent, just a nurse to the seed, the new-sown seed that grows and
swells inside her. The man is the source of life-the one who mounts." Id.
66. See id. at 269.
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to balance biological necessity and moral and political freedom.6 7 The
authority of law allows it to fulfill this role, liberating both the individual
and the community from the weight of the past, with its cycles of fear,
guilt, and vengeance, and creating a "present" for free-choice and action.
For Aeschylus, the imagery of the "pursuit of the hunt" expresses the
belief that the law is a haven and refuge. It offers security for ordered
choice and action. Aeschylus, however, does not use the image of the
hunt only to symbolize the passing away of an older epoch with the
emergence of law. He uses it to represent, as well, the fragile balance
necessary to the preservation of an ordered social universe in every pres-
ent moment. The balance of forces upholding the stability of the resolu-
tion is fragile. Orestes is, after all, acquitted by only one vote. 68 If society
does not renew its commitment to law, the social order will break and
give way again to the cycle of violence, guilt, and vengeance. In Aeschy-
lus's vision, the source of renewal is ever the same: human reason.
2. Bridging the Divide Between the Meaning of Aeschylus's Image as
Literature and Jurisprudence
Jurisprudence derives meaning from Aeschylus's image by relating it
to the values sketched in the preceding section. Merely understanding
Aeschylus's narrative as literature, for example, can deepen intellectual
and moral virtues in the reader, which are relevant to law, particularly
those of equity and critical-mindedness. The image communicates, as
well, aspects of complex human relationships pertinent to problems in
social order, with relevance in jurisprudence, such as the conflicts be-
tween individual and group, parent and child, and male and female.
Aeschylus's image serves as a part of a founding myth legitimating the
Athenian legal system. 9 Thus, it can be enlightening to compare it with
the Social Contract-arguably the legitimating myth of American law.
The Greek story justifies Athenian law by attributing it to the require-
67. See id. at 277 ("All-seeing Zeus and Fate embrace, down they come to urge our
union on-Cry, cry, in triumph, carry on the dancing and on!"). Yale Law School Profes-
sor Paul Gewirtz's interpretation is slightly different: "law is not and cannot be an enter-
prise of reason alone." Gewirtz, supra note 35, at 1049. This interpretation stresses that
Aeschylus asserts that the rule of law integrates society inclusively, including the biology
and emotion that the Furies represent, but that reason can integrate precisely because it
stands above these forces and directs them. See id. at 1048-49.
68. See AESCHYLUS, The Eumenides, supra note 4, at 260.
69. See David Luban, Some Greek Trials: Order and Justice in Homer, Hesiod,
Aeschylus, and Plato, 54 TENN. L. REV. 279, 296 (1987) ("It is overwhelmingly likely,
however, that Aeschylus means the case to stand for the beginning of the system of jus-
tice.").
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ments of reason, which, in turn, mirror the Divine. It suggests societal
peace under law as a beneficial consequence providing a ground for ac-
cepting the legal system. The order of peace under law replaces the cycle
of blood vengeance. The American story, by comparison, justifies the
American constitutional system by reference to a compact among self-
interested equals. A prudential basis for affirming the system is that it
lifts individuals out of the "state of nature," which in some readings is ac-
tually a state of war, and in others, is merely a state of isolation and eco-
nomic inefficiency.
The feature of the legal system at issue in The Eumenides is the judicial
system. Thus, it may be productive to compare the play with the Mon-
tesquiean myth of the American separation of powers as the moving
parts of a machine underlying the American concept of the judiciary. Or,
one may wish to compare it with John Marshall's vision in Marbury v.
Madison of cool judicial reason safeguarding the rule of law in the face of
legislative or executive incursions. 70
Concepts from philosophy, depth psychology, or political theory might
assist in further drawing out the meaning of Aeschylus's image for in-
quiry into the nature of law, or for the relationship of law and basic val-
ues. However, before turning to other disciplines for such terms, it
makes sense to extend the distinctive moment of literary reflection by
exploring the meaning of Aeschylus's image within the larger canon of
Western literature. The evolving meaning within the Western tradition
of the image of the "pursuit of the hunt, interrupted" by law, can enrich
jurisprudential reflection on the meaning of Aeschylus's image.
Ronald Dworkin's narrative jurisprudence asserts that judicial rea-
soning takes at least part of its meaning within a longer tapestry of hold-
ings, extending from the past through the present and on into the future.
If that idea is true with respect to law, it must, if anything, be more so of
literary works within the collection of works of recognized significance.71
The Western literary tradition unfolds in historical parallel to Western
political, legal, and constitutional traditions. The cumulative meanings of
the image within the one tradition can fairly be applied to questions
70. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
71. There is a canon of Western literature defined as "the relation of an individual
reader and writer to what has been preserved out of what has been written." HAROLD
BLOOM, THE WESTERN CANON: THE BOOKS AND SCHOOL OF THE AGES 17 (Anne
Freegood & Pat Strachan eds., 1994). Harvard University Professor Harold Bloom es-
pouses that it is within that body of preserved work that the meaning and value of any one
work is judged. See id. Bloom views his beloved Shakespeare as the central author and
highest expression of the Western canon. See id.
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arising from the other. By exploring the meaning of Aeschylus's image
within other works of Western literature, the present inquiry can be
brought to its conclusion.
III. THE IMAGE OF THE "PURSUIT OF THE HUNT, INTERRUPTED" BY
INTERVENTION OF LAW IN LATER WESTERN LITERATURE
Aeschylus's image of the "pursuit of the hunt, interrupted" and trans-
formed by law recurs, with certain qualifications or reversals, in other lit-
erary works in Western cultural tradition. Three works of particular in-
terest in this regard are authored by Tom Wolfe, Charles Dickens, and
Franz Kafka.
A. An Instance from Contemporary Fiction: The Bonfire of the Vanities
The novel The Bonfire of the Vanities72 depicts the Manhattan bond
trading market during the 1980s. The central element of the novel's plot
is the law's intervention in "the pursuit of the hunt." Upon first impres-
sion, the setting seems remote from Aeschylus's Athens.73 But Wolfe's
protagonist, Sherman McCoy, finds himself in flight from forces with an
uncanny resemblance to the Furies. McCoy's life becomes a waking
nightmare as he discovers that he is the object of an anonymous man-
hunt. Investigators are seeking him based on a witness's partial recollec-
tion of his license number after a hit-and-run killing. McCoy is an ac-
complice to the crime, which occurred during a covert meeting with his
secret mistress. Having gained notoriety in the press, the case raises an
outcry against the as yet undiscovered perpetrators, whose published
profile stirs up a mob on grounds of both class and race. As the circle
tightens on the parking garage where McCoy has parked his dented Mer-
cedes, his psychic security is progressively undermined. He eventually
becomes paralyzed by fear and unable to act.74
72. TOM WOLFE, THE BONFIRE OF THE VANITIES (1987).
73. See generally id.
74. See id. at 273. ("Sherman opened up the envelope and withdrew the newspaper.
Every crackle of the paper accused him.") Sherman continued reading:
The front page ... of no earthly interest... He opened it up... Page 2... Page 3
I .. It was at the bottom of the page: SECRET PRINTOUT IN BRONX
HIT'N'RUN .... Declaring "I'm fed up with the foot-dragging," a source within
the Division of Motor Vehicles yesterday provided The City Light with a com-
puter print out narrowing down to 124 the number of vehicles that might have
been involved in last week's hit-and-run maiming of Bronx honor student Henry
Lamb. The source.., said: "They can check out 124 vehicles in a few days. But
first they have to want to commit the manpower .... Lamb ... lies in an appar-
ently irreversible coma. Before losing consciousness, he was able to give ... the
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In Wolfe's drama of pursuit, as in Aeschylus's, the law ultimately in-
tervenes to interrupt the chase of the public outcry against McCoy. De-
spite facing a virtual riot by a disgruntled mob, Supreme Court Justice
Myron Kovistsky embodies the ideal of law by dismissing the charges
against McCoy based on a correct evidentiary ruling:
Now, in the case of the People versus Sherman McCoy, the
grand jury has returned an indictment .... I am ordering that
indictment dismissed in the interests of justice, without preju-
dice ... .. "Your honor!" [The prosecutor] was on his feet ....
[Prosecutor,] [w]hat makes you think you can come before the
bench waving the banner of community pressure? The law is
not a creature of the few or of the many. The court is not
swayed by your threats.75
Although charges are reinstated and the protagonist's guilt has not been
adjudicated by the end of the novel, the legal process has worked a moral
renewal in McCoy after a life of complacency and privilege.76
Just below the surface of Wolfe's contemporary social satire is an out-
look influenced by the classics. In important respects, Wolfe shares
Aeschylus's vision of law. In his use of the image of the "pursuit of the
hunt, interrupted," Wolfe can be read as propounding a view of law like
Aeschylus's.
Even so, Wolfe sounds realities unknown to Aeschylus. Athena's ab-
sence from Wolfe's story emblematizes the differences in the authors'
use of the image of the hunt. In Wolfe's world, gods do not bestow ideals
on mortals. The legal act transpires through the painstaking effort of
first letter-R-and five possibilities for the second letter-E, F, B, R, P-of the
license plate of the... Mercedes Benz that ran him down .... Sherman's heart
jumped inside his chest.... Police and the Office of Bronx District Attorney...
said their investigations were "continuing." They refused comment on the nar-
rowing down of the number of vehicles .... That was it. Sherman sat.., staring
at the ... type. Closing the noose!
Id. at 273-74.
75. Id. at 647-48.
76. See id. at 658. Wolfe describes the situation:
At his arraignment . . . Mr. McCoy appeared before [the] [j]udge . . . with a
slightly swollen left jaw and abrasions on the knuckles of both hands. Ques-
tioned about it by [the] [j]udge . . . he said, clenching his fists, "Don't worry,
Judge. It's something I'll take care of myself."... Mrs. McCoy was in the spec-
tator section of the courtroom yesterday, apparently unrecognized by the noisy
group of demonstrators ... who occupied most of the seats. At one point, Mr.
McCoy looked toward his wife, smiled slightly, and raised his left hand in a
clenched-fist salute. The meaning of his gesture was unclear. Mrs. McCoy re-
fused to speak to reporters.
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constructive thought, as powerful counterforces of conflict among mate-
rial interests beset the rational process. Apollonian reason does not offer
a revelation of justice, rather venal and self-interested attorneys present
their arguments. The case turns not on the single, disinterested vote of
Athena, but at times, on perjured testimony and prosecutorial miscon-
duct. Wolfe's "Furies" do not acquiesce to divine intervention, but only
to political sentiment. Wolfe's Furies are not blood loyalties; they are
the forces of mass opinion and class envy, whipped up by a cynical and
sensationalist press. The authority of law serves, not to subordinate vital
life forces to the higher faculty of reason, as such, but to mediate the ac-
quiescence of diverse interest groups.
Wolfe's protagonist does not come willingly into the court, as did
Orestes. He is dragged into the public eye, trembling. In this literary
context, the threatened dehumanization is not vengeance or guilt, but
merciless publicity ripping away every shred of personal privacy essential
to psychic well being. The gauntlet the protagonist runs is the course en-
dured by Leona Helmsley and Jim Bakker, or, of more recent memory,
Bill Clinton and Monica Lewinsky. Publicity that for Orestes was a ref-
uge has become annihilation. The legal process, which is the focus of
that publicity, becomes, ironically, the catching point for a whole new
"pursuit of the hunt."
The law appears now, at least at times, to be the Furies in pursuit. The
protagonist's mistress, the actual perpetrator of the hit-and-run in the
case, tells him:
"Sherman, let me tell you something. There's two kinds a jun-
gles. Wall Street is a jungle.["] . . . "And then there's the other
jungle. That's the one we got lost in the other night, in the
Bronx .... [In that jungle] [pleople who are all the time cross-
ing back and forth, back and forth, back and forth, from this
side of the law to the other side .... I ... gr[e]w up that way.
We were always staggering back and forth across the line, like a
buncha drunks, and so I know .... And let me tell you some-
thing else. Right there on the line everybody's an animal-the
police, the judges, the criminals, everybody."
In Wolfe's story, the classical vision of law prevails because of an up-
right judge and a protagonist capable of moral growth. The outcome is
contingent on good will and reasonableness, which in Wolfe's world may
not be taken for granted, but have to be jealously guarded. Even when
these elements prevail, the costs in human terms are high.
77. Id. at 264.
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If the classical influence on Wolfe explains his resemblance to
Aeschylus, his sensitivity to the law's pathos stems from his emulation of
the Victorian novel. William Thackeray's Vanity Fair7 8 is Wolfe's
avowed model for The Bonfire of the Vanities.79 Unlike the unitary moral
vision of Aeschylus, the vantage of the Victorian novel presumes an inte-
rior moral, emotional, and psychological life, distinguishable from public
life, providing a perspective from which to critique social form.s° The in-
dividual's "private" experience becomes a basis for criticizing law.
B. Charles Dickens's Bleak House: The Thwarting of the Human Heart
The great Victorian novel depicting the pathos of law is Charles Dick-
ens's Bleak House." This novel, in its representation of law, employs the
image the "pursuit of the hunt, interrupted." The dramatic denouement
of its long and intricate plot occurs with the flight of Lady Dedlock be-
fore the clamor of the motley Smallweed clan, who have stumbled upon
her secret: a love affair resulting in her bearing a child out of wedlock.82
78. WILLIAM MAKEPEACE THACKERAY, VANITY FAIR (Random House 1958)
(1848).
79. See Steven Erlanger, Bonfire in Bronx!!! Wolfe Catches Flak!!!, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
11, 1988, at B1. Thackeray's Vanity Fair is cited as Wolfe's "original inspiration."
80. See generally RICHARD STANG, THE THEORY OF THE NOVEL IN ENGLAND
1850-1870 (1959).
81. CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE (Norman Page ed., Penguin Books 1971)
(London, 1853) [hereinafter DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE]. When Dickens fails in attaining
pathos, he falls into sentimentality: "[Sentimentality is] ... the term ... often applied to
unsuccessful idealization or pathos, two effects which have earned a particular notoriety in
Dickens's hands." HARVEY PETER SUCKSMITH, THE NARRATIVE ART OF CHARLES
DICKENS 277 (1970).
82. See DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE, supra note 81, at 816.
'Your Ladyship, I come to put you on your guard .... I strongly suspect (from
what Small has dropped ... ) that those letters I was to have brought to your La-
dyship were not destroyed when I supposed they were. That if there was any-
thing to be blown upon it is blown upon .... Mr. Guppy picks up his hat and
rises. 'Your Ladyship, you know best whether there's anything in what I say ....
Something or nothing .... She scarcely acknowledges [his] parting words ....
She has thrown herself upon the floor, and lies with her hair all wildly scattered.
... She rises up, hurries to and fro, flings herself down again, and rocks and
moans. The horror that is upon her, is unutterable .... Thus, a terrible impres-
sion steals upon and overshadows her, that from this pursuer, living or dead-
obdurate and imperturbable before her in his well-remembered shape.., there is
no escape but in death. Hunted, she flies .... She veils and dresses quickly,
leaves all her jewels and her money, listens, goes downstairs at a moment when
the hall is empty, opens and shuts the great door; flutters away, in the shrill frosty
wind.
Id. at 814-16
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This unmasking causes Lady Dedlock to flee.
The "pursuit of the hunt" sends Lady Dedlock on a desperate flight
from her tormentors. In an ironic sense, the intervention of law allows
her to evade her pursuers, and it transforms the social situation. The
rigid stratification of English social identity, reinforced legally, permits
Lady Dedlock to shed her identity by changing clothes with a beggar
woman, discarding all personal marks of identification, and disappearing
into the streets of London.83 She eventually dies of exposure while
clinging to the gate of the disease-ridden cemetery where her natural
child's father lies buried.4
The terminus of her flight differs starkly from that of Orestes. His
flight ends on the Acropolis amidst light and the liberation of law. The
fact that the party in immediate pursuit in Bleak House is Lady Ded-
lock's lost child, Esther, bearing a note from Lord Dedlock and inscribed
with forgiveness, underscores the pathos of Lady Dedlock's "libera-
tion."" When her child arrives to find her corpse, the absolute privacy of
death has reunited the natural family. The father is buried under the
name of "Nemo," Latin for "no one. '"" The mother appears, in death, as
an unidentified street person. And the child's face has been, with sym-
bolic significance, defaced by small pox.
Lady Dedlock flees as a final move in a game of cat and mouse with
Lord Dedlock's lawyer, Tulkinghorn. The lawyer has used the classical
deductive reasoning and investigative skills of his profession to uncover
Lady Dedlock's secret. He has employed ruthless litigation-like strategy
to gain control over her. 7
83. See id. at 868.
84. See id. at 868-69.
At last we stood under a dark and miserable covered way, where one lamp was
burning over an iron gate, and where the morning faintly struggled in. The gate
was closed. Beyond it, was a burial ground-a dreadful spot in which the night
was very slowly stirring; but where I could dimly see heaps of dishonoured graves
and stones, hemmed in by filthy houses, with a few dull lights in their windows,
and on whose walls a thick humidity broke out like a disease. On the step at the
gate, drenched in a fearful wet of such a place, which oozed and splashed down
everything, I saw, with a cry of pity and horror, a woman lying .... I passed on
to the gate, and stooped down. I lifted the heavy head, put the long dark hair
aside, and turned the face. And it was my mother, cold and dead.
Id. at 867-69.
85. Id. at 825-26.
86. Id. at 185.
87. An instance is seen in the following interaction:
Mr. Tulkinghorn takes out his papers, asks permission to place them on a...
table at my Lady's elbow, puts on his spectacles, and begins to read by the light
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Tulkinghorn's legalistic tortures drive Lady Dedlock to the point of
flight from the Smallweeds, and to death. Hortense, a "tigress-like"
woman who Tulkinghorn has misused in the course of manipulating oth-
ers to gain control over Lady Dedlock, stalks and murders him.8 This is
the human nature that Tulkinghorn has so ruthlessly manipulated and
suppressed rebels. In the person of Hortense, the soul of vengeance
reaches out and exacts a price on the lawyer whose legal machinations
have taken the life of Lady Dedlock and destroyed the happiness of her
family.
Dickens affirms the classical idea of the act of legal justice anchoring
the social world, the focal theme of The Eumenides. He makes this
point, for example, as Hortense is brought to justice. Dickens's pre-
dominant interest, however, is with the pathos of the law. In Bleak
House, legal structures divide people from their own natures and from
one another. The law's machinery takes on life, as an end-in-itself, typi-
fied in the archaic Court of Chancery whose tortuous and futile proce-
dures shape the larger plot of the novel.
In Dickens's world, the legal construction of reality, more often than
not, stymies any genuine human flourishing. At its worse, law becomes a
trap that the strong set for the weak. Rather than interrupting the hunt,
as in The Eumenides, the law triggers it. The law's publicity, which was
Orestes's liberation and his return to social life, sends Lady Dedlock into
the irretrievable privacy of death.
C. The Trial by Franz Kafka: The Disintegration of the Self
In The Trial, Franz Kafka portrays the experience of law as absurd.
of a shaded lamp.... My Lady... asks impulsively: 'Who copied that?' Mr.
Tulkinghorn stops short, surprised by My Lady's animation and her unusual
tone. 'Is it what you people call law-hand?' she asks, looking full at him care-
lessly again, and toying with her screen. 'Not quite. Probably'-Mr. Tulking-
horn examines it as he speaks-'the legal character which it has, was acquired
after the original hand was formed. Why do you ask?' 'Anything to vary this
detestable monotony. 0, go on, do!' Mr. Tulkinghorn reads again. The heat is
greater, my Lady screens her face. Sir Leicester dozes, starts up suddenly, and
cries Eh? [W]hat do you say?' 'I say I am afraid,' says Mr. Tulkinghorn, who
has risen hastily, 'that Lady Dedlock is ill.'
Id. at 61-62 (footnote omitted). Tulkinghorn is a study in professional misconduct, as he
allows his fetish for control to supercede both his client's interests and express wishes:
"Dickens must have taken grim satisfaction in having an aristocrat undergo the ultimate
ignominy of dying in the slums, thanks to a lawyer's labors." Robert S. Glaser & Stephen
H. Roth, In the Matter of Heep, Jaggers, Tulkinghorn & Fogg: An Unjarndyced View of the
Dickensian Bar, 29 DICKENSIAN BAR. 278,294 (1976).
88. DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE, supra note 81, at 798-99.
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The work is prophetic of the anxieties of twentieth century mass society.
In it, Kafka makes use of the image of the "pursuit of the hunt," inter-
rupted and transformed by the law's intervention.89 The protagonist, Jo-
seph K., finds himself the subject of persecution by legal authorities pur-
suing a seemingly endless process against him, without ever positing a
true legal act.9° He discovers, for example, that he is under investigation
for an offense, but never obtains notice of the charge.9'
Officials harass and intimidate Joseph K. through their symbolizations
of the law's authority. But their gestures are ineffective in defining Jo-
seph K's guilt in a juridical sense. In Kafka's universe, the law becomes a
device for controlling behavior. It stands in vivid contrast to Aeschylus's
concept of law as enhancing freedom and enabling action. It places peo-
ple in partial check, leaving their petty aggressions and appetites unaf-
fected, while preventing them from initiating major disturbances. The
legal system itself becomes a regime of multifarious petty aggressions by
functionaries.
. In Kafka's world, legal process undermines the psychic privacy and se-
curity necessary for human agency, and Joseph K. develops paranoia. In
the end, he is taken out by two thugs without marks of authority and
killed "[l]ike a dog." Uniformed policemen stroll by the scene without
taking note or becoming involved.93 Kafka describes a world where the
very possibility of law as a moral ideal has become impossible. Legal
symbols have become hopelessly detached from any moral universe in
89. See generally, FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL (Willa Muir & Edwin Muir trans.,
Schocken Books 1984).
90. See generally id.
91. See id. at 11-12. Joseph K. ponders:
"I cannot recall the slightest offense that might be charged against me. But that
even is of minor importance, the real question is, who accuses me? What
authority is conducting these proceedings? Are you officers of the law? None of
you has a uniform, unless your suit" ... is to be considered a uniform, but it's
more like a tourist's outfit. I demand a clear answer to these questions, and I feel
sure that after an explanation we shall be able to part from each other on the best
of terms." The Inspector flung the matchbox down on the table. "You are la-
boring under a great delusion," he said. "These gentlemen here and myself have
no standing whatever in this affair of yours, indeed we know hardly anything
about it. We might wear the most official uniforms and your case would not be a
penny the worse. I can't even confirm that you are charged with an offense, or
rather I don't know whether you are. You are under arrest, certainly, more than
that I do not know."
Id.
92. Id. at 229.
93. See id. at 226-27.
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which they could take on human meaning. They function as mere masks
for petty annoyance, and ultimately permit the protagonist's judicial
murder. This murder represents the definitive disintegration of the self
for whom existential authenticity has become impossible.
In the novel, the painter Titorelli paints official portraits expressing the
authority of judges.94 As the protagonist watches Titorelli work, the im-
ages of the judges appear to intimidate from their canvasses and they
take on a look of menacing animals. Joseph K. observes as Titorelli
paints a representation of "Justice Personified" for one judge's cham-
bers.95 As he watches the goddess of Justice being painted, she trans-
forms herself into the goddess of Hunt in Full Cry. To Joseph K's horri-
fied sight, the Pallas Athena of Aeschylus's vision, now completely
incredible, becomes the chief Fury in hot pursuit.
Kafka suggests that the words and symbols of legal construction can
themselves become a vehicle for sub-rational drives. This occurs where
the person and society alike have lost their capacity to assign moral sig-
nificance to actions and events and merely vie over control. With his fi-
nal image of the 'goddess Justice' transformed, Kafka expresses insight
into the ambiguity of every image symbolizing a moral or legal ideal.
Rather than furthering reasonable action, such symbols may trigger sti-
fling guilt and desperate, dishonest efforts at evasion. In the Kafkaesque
depths of subjective anxiety, the classical model of Aeschylus has be-
come unbelievable.
Kafka's characters lack the inner resources that sustain Wolfe's classi-
cal vision in The Bonfire of the Vanities. The pain and alienation occur-
ring through law reach nightmarish proportions. They overwhelm, not
only any notion of law as a moral ideal, but the concept of pathos itself.
94. See id. at 143-44
95. See id. at 146-47. Kafka describes the situation:
[Joseph K. saw] a large figure... he could not identify, and he asked the painter
whom it was intended to represent .... " It is Justice," said the painter at last.
"Now I can recognize it," said K. "There's the bandage over the eyes, and here
are the scales. But aren't there wings on the figure's heels, and isn't it flying?"
"Yes," said the painter, "my instructions were to paint it like that; actually it is
Justice and the goddess of Victory in one." "Not a very good combination,
surely," said K., smiling. "Justice must stand quite still, or else the scales will wa-
ver and a just verdict will become impossible."... "My client wished it," said the
painter ... K. watched the delicate crayon-strokes ... the figure of Justice was
left bright except for an almost imperceptible touch of shadow; that brightness
brought the figure sweeping right into the foreground and it no longer suggested
the goddess of Justice, or even the goddess of Victory, but looked exactly like a
goddess of the Hunt in Full Cry.
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The lack of any objective measure of proportionality, such as that found
by the Victorians in the simple pleasures of private family life leave the
protagonist, who is drowning in his unbounded anxiety and horror, com-
pletely unsympathetic.
For Aeschylus, the law bridges the span between inner self-
authenticity and outer participation in and ordered community. Kafka,
by contrast, sees the law as a heteronomous and invasive force, inacces-
sible to the individual subject as a touchstone of authenticity. The Trial
underscores this paralyzing disconnect in its parable of the doorkeeper of
the law:
In the writings which preface the Law that particular delusion is
described thus: before the Law stands a doorkeeper. To this
doorkeeper there comes a man ... who begs for admittance to
the Law .... The man ... asks if he will be allowed.., to enter
'It is possible,' answers the doorkeeper, 'but not at this
moment' . . . . [T]he Law, he thinks, should be accessible to
every man and at all times, but when he looks more closely at
the doorkeeper in his furred robe, with his huge, pointed nose
and long, thin, Tartar beard, he decides that he had better wait
until he gets permission to enter .... There he sits waiting for
days and years .... Finally his eyes grow dim and he does not
know whether the world is really darkening around him or
whether his eyes are only deceiving him .... Before he dies, all
that he has experienced during the whole time of his sojourn
condenses in his mind into one question .... He beckons the
doorkeeper, since he can no longer raise his stiffening body ....
'Everyone strives to attain the Law,' answers the man, 'how
does it come about, then, that in all these years no one has
come seeking admittance but me?' The doorkeeper perceives
that the man is nearing his end and his hearing is failing, so he
bellows in his ear: 'No one but you could gain admittance
through this door, since this door was intended for you. I am
now going to shut it.'9'
IV. THE CUMULATIVE SIGNIFICANCE FOR JURISPRUDENCE OF THE
IMAGE OF THE "HUNT, INTERRUPTED" BY LAW
Comparison with related images in other literary works does not di-
minish the independent value for jurisprudence of Aeschylus's original
image of the "pursuit of the hunt, interrupted." Aeschylus's image, on its
own terms, marks basic and universal objectives of law: the resolution of
96. Id. at 213-15.
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disputes and attribution of fault, in a manner supporting individual integ-
rity and freedom of action. Where the law cannot fulfill this role, a loss
of moral identity threatens the individual from without and within. Soci-
ety emerges from mere primitive tribalism, with its blood feuds, by ad-
herence to a common concept of legal authority and common norms of
behavior, but also through common respect for the inner authority of the
individual. In short, human society, as such, emerges with the advent of
the rule of law.
All of the literary depictions of the "pursuit of the hunt" considered by
this article symbolize a disruption in the equilibrium of forces needed by
both individual and society to realize the idea of the rule of law. In each
account, law advances or inhibits the reasonable integration of forces
within the individual, and within the community, through its mode of
conflict resolution.
Comparison with Wolfe, Dickens, and Kafka suggests that Aeschylus
does not acknowledge the ways in which law may fail in this integrative
endeavor or the casualties that may occur, when the law does succeed.
Aeschylus is unable to recognize failure or casualty because of his belief
in fate. Even when the cycle of blood vengeance has been broken,
Aeschylus's hero, Orestes, remains cool and unfazed throughout the ac-
tion of the play because his fixed and unchanging character imbues him
with reasonableness. He acts well because it is his fate to have the Sun
god's counsel and the goddess of Wisdom's protection. The fated charac-
ter of the downfall suffered of others diminishes our capacity to empa-
thize with them.
As we turn from the optimism of the classical Greeks and to the Victo-
rians, with their concern for the inner pathos of the individual, we dis-
cover that the vital biological forces, supposedly integrated at the close of
The Eumenides, are actually subject to repression in Bleak House. In-
stead of integrating the matrilineal bond into a reasonable societal order,
with due recognition for public and private realms, the law suppresses
the claims of the blood tie and puts mother and child asunder.
For Dickens, the rule of law remains at the level of aspiration. Legal
institutions are ambiguous in their effect. The pathos of negative effects
absorbs Dickens's attention. The general rule may do harm in the indi-
vidual instance so that equitable discretion remains a necessity. The
wheels of justice become encrusted through greed, venality, and inatten-
tion. The law is semper reformanda. Dickens's reformist impulse places
him as a contemporary of Bentham's.
Nineteenth and twentieth century literature is aware that the law's in-
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tegrative task is more complex than Aeschylus can acknowledge.
Authors like Dickens and Wolfe focus on the corrupting effects of the
greed and venality of lawyers who bend the law to their clients' private
interests and manipulate their clients for the sake of fees.
Both Dickens and Wolfe, moreover, understand the rule of law differ-
ently than Aeschylus. Rather than the integration of the biological and
the rational, Dickens sees the law's role as coordinating social and eco-
nomic relationships, accommodating social classes, professions and occu-
pations, and leaving space for individual fulfillment within the sentimen-
tal realm of the family. In Wolfe's twentieth-century conception, the law
channels mass society's energies, with its atomized millions, and over-
comes mutual wariness among ethnic and social groups against the base-
line of amoral economic competition.
Aeschylus holds out law as offering stability and security, a respite
from the "pursuit of the hunt" for the individual. But, the other authors
considered here are conscious that the law sometimes fails to achieve this
end. Even where it succeeds, the law's blessings are not unmixed. The
Bonfire of the Vanities illustrates that the law may bring the annihilating
glare of harsh publicity and the violation of privacy, as well as the clear
cleansing light of the Acropolis. Its publicity can be a floodlight over-
whelming subjectivity, rather than restoring it. Bleak House and The
Bonfire of the Vanities both attest that class interest, greed, and violence
can gain command of legal processes. At times, the law becomes the Fu-
ries in pursuit, as Kafka vividly reminds us with the image of Justice as
the goddess of the Hunt in Full Cry.
Dickens and Wolfe qualify the Aeschylean faith in the idea of law, but
Kafka appears to reject it. The societal harmony, derived under law for
Aeschylus, does not appear in Kafka, who includes in his vision no realm
of moral and political freedom. Kafka's world is one of total bureauc-
racy or even totalitarianism hostile to human subjectivity. For Kafka, the
pursuit of the hunt, thus, moves to a point within the psyche. The law,
symbolized as the Furies in pursuit, causes the subject to lose his or her
inner sense of authority and stability, and to move into paranoid flight.
Only death can halt this "pursuit of the hunt." Kafka may imply that
courage in the existentialist sense is a counter to the depersonalizing ef-
fect of law.
At the very least, Kafka humanizes the judge or lawyer who is his
reader by revealing that, for many if not most, the experience of law is, at
times, one of "Kafkaesque" dread. The dread may arise because the
wheels of the law continue to turn, although disengaged from human
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meaning,97 or because, in the subject's effort to integrate legal events, it
gives rise to pathos exceeding understanding.
Kafka assumes Aeschylus's vision to be untenable, but perhaps he only
means to suggest that this is so in a society, such as Kafka's own that has
already lost its faith in the Aeschylean ideal. Kafka's story portrays life
in a society repudiating Aeschylus's myth, whether that of the Hapsburg
Empire in its twilight or the Soviet Union, which followed it in portions
of Europe. How, then, does Aeschylus's myth compare to our own story
of the Social Contract? What Kafkaesque turn can we expect in our le-
gal culture if we lose faith in it?
What new Furies, understood in either Aeschylean or Kafkaesque
senses, might prowl in the wake of such loss of faith? Would the remedy
to their arrival lie in renewal through retrieval of the Aeschylean ideal of
law as reason, or the forging of a Kafka-inspired jurisprudence of exis-
tentialist authenticity?
Literature's insights into law are cumulative and inclusive. Literature,
at least, does not require one to elect from the myths it recounts. All of
its images remain available for application, juxtaposition, and contrast
within jurisprudence. For each ideal it proposes, literature tenders asso-
ciated disappointments, deflections, detours, lost ways and pains. Litera-
ture presents multi-layered pathos and, at the same time, the beauty of
the whole of life. By contrast, the school of "law and economics" focuses
only on the potential of choice to maximize wealth. Its only "pathos" is a
failure to maximize. The school of Critical Legal Studies contemplates
literature's expression of the "jurispathic," but regrettably is led by it to
discount law as a distinctive ideal.
In its own way, literature, even in the case of Kafka, can be drawn
upon to affirm a normative vision of law. Even in the case of a classical
author like Aeschylus, however, such a vision includes an element of
ambivalence. The consequences of tragic choices may be devastating
when the law fails; when the law succeeds it is comedy, in the sense of
holding together the broken pieces of tragedy averted.
Lawyers can take the law's ambivalence to heart and still preserve
their belief in what they do by adopting a comic stance. Their attitude
might reasonably seek to be like Shakespeare's in the later more mature
97. Another reading is possible. The Trial has been understood to demonstrate that
"criminal mentality operates in a psychological arena as yet only dimly apprehended by
society." Raymond L. Hogler, Conrad, Kafka and the Criminal Justice System, 3 J.
CONTEMP. L. 75, 81 (1976).
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comedy, Measure for Measure.98 This play ends on a mellow, bittersweet
note, as its comic resolution of difficulties cannot actually make every-
thing all right.99 Under the circumstances of life, the resolution may be
the best for which one can hope; its bittersweetness may be the truest
statement of the mystery of the human situation.
98. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MEASURE FOR MEASURE.
99. See id. act 5, sc. 1.
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